The use of opaque, uninterpretable artificial intelligence systems in health care can be medically beneficial, but it is often viewed as potentially morally problematic on account of this opacity—because the systems are black boxes. Alex John London has recently argued that opacity is not generally problematic, given that many standard therapies are explanatorily opaque and that we can rely on statistical validation of the systems in deciding whether to implement them. But is statistical validation sufficient to justify implementation of these (...) AI systems in health care, or is it merely one of the necessary criteria? I argue that accountability, which holds an important role in preserving the patient‐physician trust that allows the institution of medicine to function, contributes further to an account of AI system justification. Hence, I endorse the vanishing accountability principle: accountability in medicine, in addition to statistical validation, must be preserved. AI systems that introduce problematic gaps in accountability should not be implemented. (shrink)

Researchers in virtually every discipline rely on sophisticated proprietary software for their work. However, some researchers are unable to afford the licenses and instead procure the software illegally. We discuss the prohibition of software piracy by intellectual property laws, and argue that the moral basis for the copyright law offers the possibility of cases where software piracy may be morally justified. The ethics codes that scientific institutions abide by are informed by a rule-consequentialist logic: by preserving personal rights to authored (...) works, people able to do so will be incentivized to create. By showing that the law has this rule-consequentialist grounding, we suggest that scientists who blindly adopt their institutional ethics codes will commit themselves to accepting that software piracy could be morally justified, in some cases. We hope that this conclusion will spark debate over important tensions between ethics codes, copyright law, and the underlying moral basis for these regulations. We conclude by offering practical solutions for researchers. (shrink)

This month’s Target Article by Blumenthal-Barby et al. (2022) offers a defense of the importance of philosophy to bioethics. The authors cite the crucial role of philosophers in the development and...

In the philosophical debate about the desirability of immortality it is argued that immortality could never be desirable, since it requires us to either take on a life where none of our projects or interests stimulate us anymore, or else to loosen our connections to our past selves and no longer survive. I argue that both concerns can be met by considering the role that partial forgetting of past experiences would play in the immortal life. One who loses some non‐essential (...) memories of their past stands to be able to enjoy experiences that have grown tiresome with age. My contribution is to clarify how partial forgetting of only the non‐essential memories allays concerns about our potentially loosened connections to our earlier states. I then consider an objection to my account, that since the standards governing collective memory might be more demanding than those governing individual memory, immortal people might sacrifice aspects of their collective lives to render their own immortal lives enjoyable. (shrink)

In the philosophical debate about the desirability of immortality it is argued that immortality could never be desirable, since it requires us to either take on a life where none of our projects or interests stimulate us anymore, or else to loosen our connections to our past selves and no longer survive. I argue that both concerns can be met by considering the role that partial forgetting of past experiences would play in the immortal life. One who loses some non‐essential (...) memories of their past stands to be able to enjoy experiences that have grown tiresome with age. My contribution is to clarify how partial forgetting of only the non‐essential memories allays concerns about our potentially loosened connections to our earlier states. I then consider an objection to my account, that since the standards governing collective memory might be more demanding than those governing individual memory, immortal people might sacrifice aspects of their collective lives to render their own immortal lives enjoyable. (shrink)